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I. OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical malpractice case. Mr. Wicke! Chamberlain breached the 
standard of care when he performed a hemorrhoidectomy and fissurectomy on Mr. WickeL Dr. 
Chamberlain used a device to perform the hemorrhoidectomy. Mr. Wicket claims that Dr. 
Chamberlain placed the staple line from the PPH too close to the dentate line in violation of the 
standard of care. During the hemorrhoidectomy, Dr. Chamberlain discovered an anal fissure and 
performed a fissurectomy on Mr. Wickel to repair the anal fissure. Fissurectomy is the gold standard 
procedure to repair an anal fissure. Mr. Wickel alleges 
informed consent from ~fr. Wickel. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Chamberlain did this without obtaining 
Mr. Wicke! filed his Complaint on January 3, 2012, after completing the pre-litigation 
screening process. R. Vol. I, p. 14. On February 26, 2013, Chamberlain filed a ;\;fotion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that Wickel did not have the requisite expert testimony pursuant to 
LC. § 6-1013, to prove his malpractice claims. response, Wickel filed his Afemorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 22, 2103, along with several 
supporting affidavits, including the Affidavit ofJessica Wilson (R. Vol. I, p. 106) and the A,ffidavit 
ofJoseph A. Scoma. 1Y!D .. R. Vol. I, p. 95. 
Jessica \Vilson's affidavit stated that she had contacted all of the general surgeons in Idaho 
Falls but either could not find a general surgeon who performed hemorrhoidectomies using the PPH 
device or could not a general surgeon who was willing to speak with Dr. Scoma about the local 
standard of care. She had the same experience vvith general surgeons in Pocatello. R. Vol. L p. 106-
1 
107. Ms. Wilson did not identify any of the physicians she allegedly contacted. 
Dr. Scoma's affidavit stated that he had a conversation with a general surgeon in Twin Falls, 
[daho. Dr. Stephen Schmid, regarding the standard of care with respect to performing the 
hemorrhoidectomy with the PPH device. R. Vol. L p. 96. Dr. Scoma indicated that after his 
conversation with Dr. Schn1id he determined that the community standard of care did not deviate 
from the national standard of care. R. Vol. I, p. 96-97. There was no discussion in Dr. Scoma' s 
affidavit about how Dr. Schmid was familiar with the local standard of care or the national standard 
of care. In addition, there was no discussion regarding the standard of care for diagnosing anal 
fissures, performing fissurectomies or obtaining informed consent. Id. 
Dr. Chamberlain filed a Second Jfotion fhr Summary Judgment on May 28, 2013, (R. Vol. 
L p. 121) on the basis that there was no evidence that Dr. Schmid was familiar with the local 
standard of care in Idaho Falls, and, as a result. Dr. Scoma failed to show that he had actual 
knowledge of the applicable community standard of care for use of the PPH device, fissurectomies, 
and informed consent. R. Vol. I, p. 109. 
Wickel filed his Afemorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Second /vfotion for Summary 
Judgment on June 17, 2013. R. Vol. II, p. 196. Wickel argued that the local standard of care in Idaho 
Falls with respect to the PPH device was indeterminable based on the Affidavit of Jessica Wilson 
and therefore, Scoma was allowed to supplement the local standard of care with the standard of care 
in a similar community. Wicke! contended that Dr. Schmid had knowledge of the standard of care 
in a similar community, Twin Falls, and that Dr. Scoma familiarized himself with the Twin Falls 
standard of care through his conversation with Dr. Schmid. R. Vol. IL p. 207-213. 
Chamberlain filed his Reply J1femorandum on June 24, 2013, and again argued that Scoma 
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was not familiar with the local standard of care and that the standard of care was not indeterminable 
in Idaho Falls. Chamberlain aiso pointed out that whether Twin Falls was a similar community to 
Idaho Falls \Vas a question of fact and there was no evidence in the record to support Wickel' s 
assertion that Twin Falls was similar to Idaho Falls. R. Vol. IL p. 240-246. 
The District Court granted Chamberlain's Second J4orionfor Summary .Judgment on July 25, 
2013. R. Vol. II, p. 405. The District Court found that the Idaho Falls standard ofcare with respect 
to the PPH device was indetem1inable. R. Vol.I I, p. 411-12. However, the District Court also found 
that there were no facts to support the conclusion that Twin Falls was a similar community and that 
Dr. Scoma' s affidavit lacked the necessary foundation. R. Vol. II, p. 412. 
Wickel filed a Motionfor Reconsideration on August 12, 2013, (R. Vol. III, p. 448) along 
with a Supplemental Affidavit of.Joseph A. Scoma, ivfD .. R. Vol. UL p. 420. The Supplemental 
Affidavit ofScoma set forth additional details about his conversation with Dr. Schmid and describe 
a second conversation Dr. Scoma had with Dr. Schmid regarding Dr. Schmid' s practice history and 
his prior training and use of the PPH device. R. Vol. III, p. 421. 
Wickel argued in his A1otion for Reconsideration that the District Court erred vvhen it 
considered and decided that there was no evidence supporting the conclusion that Twin Falls was 
a similar community to Idaho Falls because Chamberlain never raised the issue in his Second }lotion 
for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. m, p. 426-429. In addition, Wickel argued that Twin Falls and 
Idaho Falls were indeed similar communities and listed facts and statistics in the brief which he 
contended the district court could take judicial notice of R. Vol. III, p. 429-436. 
Wickel also argued in his lvfotionfor Reconsideration that the district court misapplied the 
law with respect to the local consulting physician. R. Vol. III, p. 436-444. According to WickeL the 
,, 
.) 
Court should not have decided whether Schmid had foundation about the Twin Falls and/or national 
standard of health care, but should have simply determined if there were sufficient facts in the record 
to generate triable issues about Dr. Schmid's kr10\vledge of the Twin Falls and national standard of 
health care. R. Vol. III, p. 437- 438. 
Chamberlain filed his Briefin Opposition to Plaintiff's Jfo£ionj()r Reconsideration ofFinal 
Judgment and a J;/otion to Strike rhe Supplemental Ajjidavir ofJoseph A. Scoma, Af D. (R. Vol. IIL 
p. 450) and a Renewed Motion to Strike Exhibitsfrom the Affidavits ofJohn Avondet. R. Vol. III, 
p. 459. Chamberlain asked the district court to strike Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit on the basis 
that it contradicted his prior deposition testimony and that it contained numerous conclusory and 
factually unsupported statements. R. Vol. III, p. 450-457. 
In his Briefin Opposition to Plaintiff's AJotionfor Reconsideration, Chamberlain argued that 
the district court should not consider Dr. Scoma' s Supplememal Ajjidavir, (R. Vol. III, p. 4 71-4 7 5), 
that it was proper for the district court to decided the issues of similar communities because Wickel 
placed the issue before the district court during the prior summary judgment proceedings (R. Vol. 
IIL p. 4 75-77), and that Wickel had still failed to put evidence in the record supporting that Twin 
Falis and Idaho Falls were similar communities. R. Vol. III, p. 4 77-81. Chamberlain also explained 
that the district court did not misapply the law regarding local consulting physicians aird that the 
FDA approval of the PPH device cannot be establish the local standard of care. R. Vol. III, p. 481-
84. 
Wickel filed his Reply J1femorandum in Support of Afotion j()r Reconsideration and 
i'v!emorandum in Opposition to Defendant's J;fotion to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit a/Joseph 
A. Scoma. AfD. on August 22, 2013. R. Vol. III, p. 496. The Reply 1'vfemorandum contended that 
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Scoma 's Supplemental Affidavit contained all the necessary information needed to show that Schmid 
had foundation to discuss the Twin Falis and national standard of care. R. Vol. III. p. 501-51 L 
Wicke! again argued that Chamberlain failed to raise the issue of similar communities in his Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and that the district court should give Wickel all favorable inferences 
regarding the similarity of Idaho Falls and Twin Falls. R. Vol. III, p. 511-516. Wickel also again 
argued that the Court misapplied the law regarding local, consulting physicians. R. Vol. III, p. 516-
18. Finally, Wicke! argued that the district court should not have entered judgment dismissing the 
informed consent and failure to diagnose the fissure claims and that the district court should rule on 
the applicability of the FDA approval of the PPH device. R. Vol. III, p. 519-22. 
The District Court denied Wickers Motion for Reconsideration on September 30, 2013. R. 
Vol. III, p. 526. The Court found that it could consider Scoma's Supplemental Affidavit and denied 
Chamberlain Motion to Strike Scoma ·s Supplemental Affidavit. R. Vol. III, p. 529-30. The Court 
also granted in part and denied in part Chamberlain's Afotion to Strike the Exhibits from the 
Affidavits ofJohn Avondet. R. Vol. III, p. 536-39. The district court also found that Scoma's 
Supplemental Af1idavit was sufficient to demonstrate that Dr. Schmid had foundation to testify about 
the Twin Falls standard of care. R. Vol. III, p. 531-33. 
However, the district court ruled that Wicke! had waived his right to object to the Court 
deciding the issue of similar communities when he raised the argument in his Reply BrieC never 
raised the issue prior to his Motion for Reconsideration, and/or never requested a continuance. R. 
Vol. III, p. 533-34. The district court also found that Wickel failed to put sufficient evidence in the 
record to establish that Twin Falls and Idaho Falls vvere similar communities. R. Vol. III, p. 534-36. 
On October 28. 2013, this Court issued an Order Remanding to District Court giving the 
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district court jurisdiction to enter a corrected final judgment. This Order suspended the appeal until 
a corrected final judgment was entered after which it would proceed. 
Wickel filed a Second /\!lotion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2013, along with a Second 
Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma. R. Vol. III, pp. 57 4-88. The district court entered its corrected 
Final Judgment on October 31, 2013. R. Vol. III, p. 589. Chamberlain filed his Objection and 
Afemorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second }vforion for Reconsideration on November 12, 
2013, arguing that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Wickers Second Motion for 
Reconsideration, that it was untimely, and that in any event it failed to correct the evidentiary 
deficiencies that allowed the district court to grant Chamberlain summary judgment. R. Vol. III, p. 
592-607. 
On November 14, 2013, Chamberlain filed an Alternative lfotionfor Reconsideration and 
the Affidavit of Dr. James Richards·. R. Vol. III, p. 608-14. The Affidavit of Dr. Richards set forth 
that he and his partner Dr. Stephen Carter, performed hemorrhoidectomies using the PPH device in 
2010 in Idaho Falls. R. Vol. III, p. 613. The district court heard argument on the issue ofjurisdiction 
relating to Wickel' s Second Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 2013. R. Vol. III, p. 623. 
On December 18, 2013, the district court issued its Opinion and Order Denying Wicke! 's Second 
1'4otion for Reconsideration ruling that it would not hear Wicket's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration. R. Vol. III, p. 625. Wicke1 filed an Amended Notice ofAppeal on December 23, 
2013. R. Vol. III, p. 630. Chamberlain filed a Second Amended b/otice of Cross-Appeal on 
December 30, 2013. R. Vol. III, p. 636. 
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Statement of Facts. 
1. John a ten year of hemorrhoids. Vol. I, p. 64 Depa., 
p. 26, 11. 4-7). The medical records indicate had a hemorrhoid problem throughout adult life. 
Affidavit of David Chamberlain, D. 0., R. Vol. L p. 4 L para. 3. Mr. Wickel recalled having 
hemorrhoid problems about four times per year. R. Vol. I, p. 64 (Wickel Depa., p. 
Wickel testified that the pain with most episodes was minimal-'·uncomfortable 
stopper." R. Vol. I, p. 64 (Wicke! Depa., p. 26, 11. 22-25). 
8-10). Mr. 
not a show 
2. However, Mr. Wicke! testified that in about October of 2009, the rectal pain with the 
hemorrhoids increased '·significantly" and became constant. R. Vol. I, p. 64 ( Wicket Depo., 27, 11. 
23-25; p. 28, 11. 1-15; p. 29, 11. 1-7). The pain did not go away-"it was hurting all the time." R. 
Vol. I, p. 30 (Wicke/ Depo. p. 30, 11. 1-3). This was alarming to him. R. Vol. I, p. 64 (Wicke! Depo., 
p. 27, 11. 22-25; p. 28, 11. 1 ). The pain doubled in intensitv from what he had previously experienced. 
R. Vol. I, p. 64 (Wicket Depo ., p. 28, ll. 11-15). It was beyond discomfort. Id. 
3. Mr. Wickel further testified that he initially tried over-the-counter medications like 
Preparation-Hand Hydrocort. R. Vol. I, p. 64-67 (Wicke! Depo., p. 29, 11. 3 - 24; p. 32, 11. 8 p. 34, 
11. 16; p. 40, 11. 9 - 19). When that did not work, in November or December 2009, he went to see 
a family practitioner in Wyoming near where Mr. Wickel lived. R. Vol. I, p. 65 (Wicke! Depo, p. 31, 
ll. 5 - 16). Dr. Kirk or his physician's assistant performed a rectal examination on Mr. Wickel and 
told him that he had hemorrhoids. R. Vol. I, p. 66 (Wicke! Depo., p. 34, 11. 17-20). There was no 
mention of a fissure. R. Vol. I, p. 66 (Wickel Depo., p. 11. 5-12). 
4. Either Dr. Kirk or his physician's assistant gave Mr. Wickel a prescription 
ProctoFoam. R. Vol. I, p. 65 (Wicke! Depa., p. 32, 11. 1-10). He continued using Psyllium Husks, 
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which he thought was a purer form of Metamucil. R. Vol. I, p. 67 (Wicke! Depa., p. 40, 11. 9-19). 
He had been using this fiber supplement for many years. Id. Mr. Wicket testified that these 
medications and the fiber provided "insufficient relief" R. Vol. L p. 66 (Wicke! Depa .. p. 34, 11. 12-
16). Although he couldn't remember for sure, Mr. Wickel likely called in sick due to the rectal 
symptoms he was experiencing. R. Vol. L p. 67 (Wicke! Depa., p. 41, 11. 11-14). He recalled 
thinking, "this is ridiculous.'' Id. 
5. He saw Dr. Kirk or his physician's assistant two or three times. R. Vol. I, p. 65 
(Wicke! Depo., p. 32, 11. 1-7). Finally, they told him, "You've got some pretty severe hemorrhoids 
right here. You probably better go see someone else if they're bothering you so much." R. Vol. I, 
p. 67 (Wicke! Depo., p. 39, 11. 2-9). He was then referred to Dr. Chamberlain. R. Vol. I, p. 67 
(Wicke/ Depo., p. 38, 11. 19-24; p. 39, 11. 7-9). After the conservative care provided by the Wyoming 
health care providers failed, Mr. Wicke! made the appointment with Dr. David Chamberlain. Id. 
6. Dr. Chamberlain first saw Mr. Wickel on January 4, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 53 
(Deposition of David Chamberlain, D. 0., p. 42, 11. 21-24). Mr. Wickel was an airline pilot which 
required him to sit for extended periods of time. R. Vol. I, p. 55 (Chamberlain Depa., p. 50, 11. 15 -
p. 51, 11. 9); R. Vol. I, p. 63 (Wicke! Depa, p. 7, ll. 19 - p. 8, 11. l); R. Vol. I, p. 68 (Wicke! Depo., 
p. 58, 11. 3-10). 
7. Mr. Wickel presented to Dr. Chamberlain with complaints of pain with hemorrhoids. 
R. Vol. I, p. 54 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 46, 11. 25 - p. 47, 11. 9: p. 48, 11. 5 -12; p. 55, 11. 21 - p. 56, 
11. 12). 
8. Dr. Chamberlain performed a rectal examination on Mr. Wickel. He diagnosed Mr. 
Wickel with grade III (thrombosed. extruding, painful) internal hemorrhoids and external 
8 
hemorrhoids. R. Vol. I, p. 54 (Chamberlain Depa. p. 48, 11. 5 - 8). However. Dr. Chamberlain could 
not complete the examination due to Mr. Wicket's complaints of pain. He therefore informed Mr. 
Wicke! that he would need to do a rectal exam under anesthesia in order to do a complete evaluation. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 54 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 48. ll. 13 - p. 49, 11. 11); R. Vol. I, p. 69 (Wicke! Depa., p. 
64, 11. 9 - p. 65, 11. 2). 
9. In light of the fact that conservative medical treatment had already failed to resolve 
the Grade III hemorrhoids. Dr. Chamberlain recommended that Mr. Wicke! undergo an internal 
hemorrhoidectomy using a PPH 1 device and an external hemorrhoidectomy using a harmonic 
scalpel.. R. Vol. I, p. 54-55 (Chamberlain Depa, p. 49, 11. l - p. 50, ll. 4 ). Dr. Chamberlain 
discussed with Mr. Wicke! the risks, alternatives, and benefits of having an internal 
hemorrhoidectomny with a PPH device and an external hemerrhoidectomy with a scalpel. R. Vol. 
I, p. 56 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 54, 11. 5 -24). 
10. On January 4, 20 l 0, Mr. Wickle signed a Financial Policy form which also contained 
a Consent for Treatment. R. Vol. L p. 70 (Wicke! Depa., p. 67, 11. 7-21); R. Vol. L p. 74. This form 
stated, "I hereby authorize and request David J. Chamberlain, D.O., P.A .... to provide me with any 
and all necessary evaluations and/or treatment." Id. It further stated, "I have read and understand 
the financial policy/consent for treatment and agree to be bound by its terms." Id. This is the last 
sentence on the form and is located just above the signature line containing Mr. Wickel' s signature. 
Id. 
1 A medical device which is inserted into the rectum and then by way of a circular 
stapling process, removes the hemorrhoid tissue and closes the wound. 
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11. rvfr. Wicke! signed another one-page Surgical Procedure Consent form prior to 
surgery. R. Vol. l, p. 70 (Wicke! Depa., p. 67, 11. 22-25; p. 68, 11. 1-13); R. Vol. I, p. 76. That 
consent form states. in part, ··I consent to the performance upon: John Wickel The following 
operation or procedure: Rectal exam under anesthesia with internal and external hemorrhoidectomy 
with PPH and harmonic scalpel." R. Vol. I, p. 76. Mr. Wickel's initials are affixed next to that 
paragraph of the consent form. Id. 
12. The consent form also contains the following language: '·2. The nature and purpose 
of the operation or procedure. the risks of the operation or procedure, and the possibilities of 
complications and alternate treatment options have been explained to me. 3. It has been explained 
to me that a satisfactory result is expected but that the following are some of the complications 
or effects that could or may occur: Bleeding, infection, damage to adjacent tissues or organs, 
swelling, pain, suture reaction, delayed healing, scarring, anesthesia or medication reaction, 
recurrence, additional operations, and in rare instances, paralysis or death." (Emphasis in 
original). Id. Mr. Wicke I's initials are affixed next to each of those paragraphs. Id. 
13. The consent form stated, "4. No guarantee or assurance has been given by anyone 
as to the results that may be obtained." Id. Mr. Wickel initialed next to paragraph 4. ld. 
14. The consent form also stated, ·'I consent to the doctors performing whatever different 
surgery or procedure they deem necessary or advisable during the course of the operation or 
procedure .... " R. Vol. I, p. 55-56 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 53, 11. 23 - p. 54, 11. 4). Again, Mr. 
Wickel' s initials are affixed next to this paragraph. R. Vol. I, p. 7 6. 
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15. Mr. Wickel initialed next to paragraph 8 of the consent form which stated, '·I 
understand that I am encouraged and invited to ask any questions I may have and all of my questions 
have been answered to my satisfaction." R. Vol. I, p. 76. 
16. Mr. Wicke! placed his signature underneath the words, "I HA VE READ AND 
UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS FOR.i\1 CONTAINS," on the consent form. (Emphasis in 
original.) R. Vol. I, p. 76. 
17. Prior to the operation, Mr. \Vickel informed Dr. Chamberlain that he wanted Dr. 
Chamberlain to do whatever needed to be done to make sure his problems were corrected. R. Vol. 
L p. 56 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 52, lL 2-7; p. 54, ll. 25 - p. 55, IL 20). Mr. Wicke! testified as 
follows: •· .. .if he could fix the hemorrhoid pain I was having, yes, that's what [ wanted him to do. 
If that was the way to treat them, to treat hemorrhoids, r wanted to have surgery, ifhe felt that's the 
way to get rid of them." R. Vol. I, p. 68 (rVickel Depa., p. 61, 11. 8-13) (Emphasis added.). 
18. With the written consents and direction from Mr. Wicke! in hand, Dr. Chamberlain 
performed the rectal examination under anesthesia and the internal and external hemorrhoidectomy 
on January 8, 20 l 0. R. Vol. I, p. 53 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 43, ll. 7-11 ). This required putting Mr. 
Wickel under the effects of a general endotracheal anesthetic. During the procedure, in addition to 
the hemorrhoids, Dr. Chamberlain discovered that Mr. Wickel had a fissure. R. Vol. I, p. 5 5 
(Chamberlain Depa., p. 51, ll. 16-22). A fissure is a cut or tear in the lining of the anal canal. 
19. Based upon Mr. Wicke I's stated desire to have done whatever was needed to correct 
his condition and to avoid the additional risks of bringing Mr. Wickel out of anesthesia to discuss 
the risks and alternatives and then, some days or weeks later, putting him under anesthesia again, Dr. 
11 
Chamberlain performed a fissurectomy and internal lateral sphincterotomy (ILS). 2 R. Vol. I, p. 55-
56 (Chamberlain Depo., p. 52. 11. 12 - 23; p. 54, li. 25-p. 55. 11. 20). Dr. Chamberlain noted in his 
operative report that Mr. Wickel tolerated the procedure well and there were no complications. See 
Chamberlain Aff., p. 2, para. 4. R. Vol. I, p. 41. 
20. The pathology report from the tissue removed by the PPH procedure indicated 
hemorrhoids. There was no sphincter or muscle tissue identified by pathology in the samples. R. 
Vol. I, p. 41, para. 5. 
21. Dr. Chamberlain tells all patients who undergo any rectal procedure (including PPH 
and/or ILS) the same thing; there is at least a three percent chance of urgency or incontinence 
associated with these types of procedures. R. Vol. I, p. 55 (Chamberlain Depa., p. 53, 11. 17 - 22). 
22. On January 21, 20 l 0, a left greater saphenous vein radio frequency ablation was 
performed on Mr. Wickel in Dr. Chamberlain's office. R. Vol. I, p. 41, para. 7. At that time, other 
than some post-operative pain from the rectal surgerv, Mr. Wickel had no other complaints. Id. 
23. On January 28, 2010, Mr. Wickel called Dr. Chamberlain's office complaining of 
night sweats. R. Vol. I, p. 41- l 2, para. 8. Mr. Wickel reported that he did not have increasirn.2: pain 
in the rectal area. Id. Dr. Chamberlain believed Mr. Wicke! was suffering from possible hypoxia 
from the narcotics he was taking. Id. He instructed Mr. Wickel to stop taking the Lortab and start 
taking Ultracet. Id. Dr. Chamberlain's office phoned in a prescription for Mr. WickeL Id. 
2 Fissurectomy and ILS are the gold standard for repairing a fissure. R. Vol. I, p. 55 
(Chamberlain Depo., p. 52, 11. 17 - 19). The fissurectomy basically consists of cauterizing the 
base ofth cut or tear to make a new wound which will want to heal. R. Vol. I, p. 55 
(Chamberlain Depo., p. 52, 11. 20 - 24; p. 53, 11. 1-6). The [LS involves dividing the internal 
sphincter muscle one time laterally to allow relaxation of the muscles and encourage healing. Id. 
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24. Dr. Chamberlain next saw Mr. Wickel regarding his hemorrhoids on February 2, 
2010. Mr. Wickel reported that he was recovering well from the surgery at that time. R. Vol. I, p. 
57 (Chamberlain Depa., p. 66, IL 22 - p. 67, 11. 12). However, at that time Mr. Wickei reported that 
he was having mild incontinence problems. R. Vol. I, p. 42, para. 9. Dr. Chamberlain recommended 
that Mr. Wicke I stop taking stool softeners but continue taking Citrucell once daily. Id. He advised 
Mr. Wickel to start doing Kegel exercises3 and informed him that minor incontinence usually is 
temporary and improves with time and healing but it can be permanent. Id. 
Dr. Chamberlain saw Mr. Wicke! again on February 17, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 57 
(Chamberlain Depa., p. 68, 11. 15-19). At that time the operative site in the rectum had healed over 
nicely but Mr. Wicke I had developed a perirectal abscess (infection). R. Vol. I, p. 58 (Chamberlain 
Depa., p. 71, 11. 10-18; p. 72, 11. 1-5). 
26. Dr. Chamberlain recommended incision and drainage of the perirectal abscess to 
which Mr. Wicke! agreed. R. Vol. I, p. 42, para. 10. Dr. Chamberlain made a small incision in the 
area of concern posterior to the anus and purulent material was drained. Id. The area was then 
probed with sterile Q-tips, hydrogen peroxide and iodoform gauze and a sterile dressing was applied. 
Id. Dr. Chamberlain prescribed Cipro for Mr. Wickel for ten days and wanted to follow up with Mr. 
Wickel in one week. Id. 
3 A pelvic floor exercise which consists of contracting and relaxing the muscles that fonn part of 
the pelvic floor. Many actions are controlled by the pelvic muscles, including "holding in" urine or 
avoiding defecation. Reproducing these types of muscle actions can yield stronger sphincter tones. In 
men, these exercises strengthen the anal sphincter muscles because the anus is the main area contracted 
when the exercise is perfonned. 
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- I. Testing of the fluid removed from the abscess indicated it was culture sensitive to 
fluoroquinolones .... R. Vol. I, p. 42, para. 11. 
28. Dr. Chamberlain next saw Mr. Wickel on February 24, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 43, para. 
12. At that time, Mr. Wickel reported his perirectal pain was remarkably improved but he v,;as still 
experiencing some pain and was have some drainage from the abscess. Id. Mr. Wickel reported that 
he had been taking his oral antibiotics. Id. A rectal examination revealed that the previous abscess 
site was nearly healed over with a small opening that still had some purulent drainage. Id. 
29. Dr. Chamberlain recommended slightly opening the drainage site to allow for better 
drainage. R. Vol. I, p. 43, para. 12. Dr. Chamberlain opened the drainage sight with a number 11 
scalpel and probed the abscess cavity with sterile Q-tips and hydrogen peroxide. Id. Dr. 
Chamberlain noted that the abscess cavity was much smaller than on the prior visit. Id. He 
recommended that Mr. Wickel continue with the oral antibiotics and switched him to Levaquin. Id. 
He discussed with Mr. Wickel the possibility of a chronic anal fistula developing and the possible 
need for further surgery in the future. Id. 
30. Mr. Wickel's next visit with Dr. Chamberlain was on March 3, 2010. The abscess 
appeared to have healed. Dr. Chamberlain believed that Mr. Wicket was doing well enough at that 
time to be discharged from his care. Mr. Wickel was to follow up with him as needed. R. Vol. I, 
p. 59 (Chamberlain Depa., p. 74, lL 3 - p. 75, IL 12). 
31. Dr. Chamberlain was later advised telephonically that Mr. Wicke! was seen by a 
physician's assistant in Wyoming on March 8, 2010 who opened the perirectal abscess and placed 
packing in it. R. Vol. I, p. 43, para. 14. The physician's assistant also reportedly gave Mr. Wickel 
4 Medicines that kill bacteria or prevent their growth. 
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antibiotics. Id. Dr. Chamberlain was informed that Mr. Wickel was seen in Wyoming by Dr. Kirk 
on March 9, 2010 and was started on Augmentin. Id. Dr. Kirk reportedly removed the packing 
placed by the physician's assistant to allow the abscess to drain. Id. Dr. Chamberlain requested that 
Mr. Wickel come to Idaho Falls for a visit but Mr. Wickel declined and informed Dr. Chamberlain 
that he had scheduled a follow-up visit with Dr. Kirk for March 11, 20 l 0. Id. 
32. Mr. Wickel returned to see Dr. Chamberlain on March 17, 2010. At that time, Mr. 
Wickel had developed a chronic anal fistula and Dr. Chamberlain recommended that Mr. Wickel see 
a colorectal surgeon for evaluation and treatment of the fistula. R. Vol. I, p. 59 (Chamberlain Depo., 
p. 77, 11. 2-21). 
33. After his March 17, 2010 visit with Dr. Chamberlain, Mr. Wickel was treated by two 
different physicians, Peter Bossart, M.D., and William Peche, M.D., colorectal surgeons in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. R. Vol. I, p. 44, para. 15. They each performed rectal surgeries on Mr. Wickel. Id. 
Despite multiple surgeries, Wickel still has complaints about rectal and incontinence problems. 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in holding that the local standard ofhealth care practice for 
general surgeons in Idaho Falls, Idaho in January of 20 l 0 was indeterminable? 
2. If the trial court did not err in finding that the local standard of health care practice 
was indeterminable with respect to the PPH procedure, does that holding relieve the 
plaintiff's burden of establishing the Idaho Falls, Idaho standard of health care 
practice for general surgeons in January of 2010 as to all other issues, such as 
diagnosing an anal fissure and/or fistula, the proper treatment of anal fissure, and 
informed consent for the treatment of anal fissure and/or fistula? 
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3. In deciding plaintiffs ;\;/orion for Reconsideration, did the trial court err m 
considering the supplemental affidavit of the out-of-state expert, Dr. Scoma? 
(i) Should Idaho recognize the sham affidavit doctrine and was the Supplemental 
Ajjidavir of Dr. Scoma a sham affidavit? 
(ii) Should the trial court have accepted the new information contained in the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma? 
(iii) Were certain statements contained in the Dr. Scoma' s Supplemental Affidavit 
admissible? 
4. Did the plaintiff offer sufficient admissible evidence to establish that the out-of-state 
expert was familiar with the appropriate local standard of health care practice? 
(i) Was there sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the local standard 
of health care practice was replaced by a national standard of health care 
practice? 
(ii) Is it sufficient for a physician to simply tell the out-of-state expert that the 
local standard of health care practice was the same as a national standard of 
health care practice or is the physician required to demonstrate that he or she 
is actually familiar with the alleged national standard of health care practice? 
HI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DlSTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMlNED THAT THE 
LOCAL STANDARD OF HEAL TH CARE PRACTICE IN lDAHO FALLS 
WAS INDETERMINABLE WITH REGARD TO THE PPH PROCEDURE. 
l. Standard of Review. 
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The Court exercises free review over questions oflaw. This Court also exercises free review 
over matters of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal 
words of the statute; those words must be given their plain. usual, and ordinary meaning: and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe 
it. but simply follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where the ianguage is capable of 
more than one reasonable construction. This Court has consistently held that where statutory 
language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted 
for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Brannon v. City of Coeur 
D'Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 848-49 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
2. The Idaho Falls standard ofcare was not indeterminable. 
In its Opinion and Order on Defendant ·s Second Afotion for Summary Judgmem, the District 
Court held that the Idaho Falls standard of care was indeterminable. R. Vol. II, p. 411 12. 
I. C. § 6-1012 states in relevant part: 
Such individual providers of health care shall be judged in such cases in comparison 
with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same class in the same 
community, taking into account his or her training, experience. and fields of medical 
specialization, ifany. If there be no other like provider in the community and the 
standard of practice is therefore indeterminable, evidence of such standard in 
similar Idaho communities at said time may be considered. As used in this act, 
the term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily served by the 
licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was or allegedly should 
have been provided. 
LC.§ 6-1012 (emphasis added). 
This Court has held that "a plaintiff may establish the community standard of care by 
reference to similar communities only where no local doctor other than the defendant exists" and that 
plaintiffs "cannot establish the local standard of care by reference to similar communities until [the 
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plaintift] has demonstrated that the standard of care ... was indeterminable due to the absence of 
other health care providers in the community.'' Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138. 146-47 (1997). 
This Court first addressed the issue of when a plaintiff may establish the community of care 
by reference to similar communities in Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752 (1992). Hoene involved 
a case in which the defendant and his partner were the only --provider" in the entire state of Idaho. 
Id. at 754. As such, the court concluded that the standard of care was indeterminable. That is clearly 
not the case here. The follov,ing is a list of general surgeons in [daho Falls other than Dr. 
Chamberlain and his two partners who appear to have been licensed to practice in Idaho prior to 
2010: 
l. Gregory Hodson, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1994. 
2. Christopher Riley, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1988. 
3. Judy Jones, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1983. 
4. Brian Obyrne, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1992. 
5. Stephen Carter, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1980. 
6. James Richards, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1979. 
7. Boyd Hammond, M.D. was licensed to practice since 1978. 
R. Vol. II, p. 268-81 (Idaho Board of Medicine Public Record Information regarding the above 
referenced general surgeons). Likewise, there are a number of general surgeons in Rexburg, 
Blackfoot, and Pocatello. Id. 
Thus there were a number ofother general surgeons practicing in Idaho Falls and surrounding 
geographical area ordinarily served by the general hospital in Idaho Falls during the relevant time 
period. In ivforris v. Thomson\, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997), the plaintiff argued that she 
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faced a situation similar to Hoene because the doctors practicing in the Emmett, Idaho community 
at the relevant time were either unavailable or biased in favor of the defendant and therefore, her out-
of-area expert could not familiarize himself with the local standard of care. Id. at 14 7. 
The Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply Hoene, stating ""In that case, the plaintiff first 
demonstrated that no health care provider other than the defendant or his business associates 
practiced in the local community and thus the local standard of care was indeterminable. Only then 
did we turn to 'similar communities· to establish the relevant standard of care.'· Id. (emphasis 
added). The court went on to state, ""Morris cannot establish the local standard of care by reference 
to similar communities until she has demonstrated that the standard of care in Emmett was 
indeterminable due to the absence of other health care providers in the community .... Morris has 
failed to establish that no other health care provider was practicing in Emmett at the time ofJessie' s 
birth through which her expert could have familiarized himself with the local standard of care.'· Id. 
( emphasis added). 
In this case, the Court relied upon the Affidavit a/Jessica Wilson and Dr. Chamberlain's 
deposition testimony that he was unaware of other general surgeons in Idaho Falls who used the PPH 
procedure to find that the standard of care was indeterminable. R. Vol. II, p. 411-12. However, this 
does not meet the standard set forth in 1viorris and the plain language of the statute that there was an 
absence of any other health care provider in the community. 
The fact that Dr. Chamberlain may not have been aware of other general surgeons using the 
PPH device in 2007 does not mean no other general surgeons were familiar with or had experience 
with the PPH device sufficient to provide Dr. Scoma with the relevant local standard of care. The 
fact is, Dr. Scoma did not even make the effort to contact any of the general surgeons in Idaho Falls 
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who may have had knowledge of the standard of care in January of 2007. R. Vol. I, p. 95 - 100. As 
such, based upon the record, there \vas no way to know what information the other general surgeons 
may or may not have known regarding the standards applicable to the PPH procedure. 
Second, the Affidavit a/Jessica Wilson merely indicates that she made some effort to contact 
general surgeons in Idaho Falls regarding their use of the PPH devise. R. Vol. I, p. 106, para. 3. 
However, Ms. Wilson does not state specifically who she contacted so there is no way to determine 
if she in fact contacted all of the appropriate general surgeons in Idaho Falls. Additionally, her 
affidavit specifically states that she phoned the general surgeons ''to inquire whether they performed 
hernorrhoidectomies using the PPH device." Id She did not reference any time period pertaining 
to her inquiry. 
Ms. Wilson's statements are broad and cone l usory. Was she asking about whether the general 
surgeons currently used the PPH device or had they used the PPH device in the past, including 2007? 
Did she ask whether any of these surgeons had any experience or training using the PPH device or 
whether any of them were aware of the standards of care applicable to using the PPH device in 2007? 
The record provides no answers to these critical questions with regard to whether the standard of care 
in Idaho Falls regarding the use of the PPH device was indeterminable. It was Wickers burden to 
establish an appropriate record from which such determinations could be made. 
Given the glaring deficiencies in Wickel's effort to show an absence of other health care 
providers in the community, the district court should not have found that the local standard of care 
was indeterminable. That portion of the district court's decision should be reversed. 
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B. WICKEL WAS STILL REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE LOCAL 
ST AND ARD OF TO ALL OTHER ISSUES EVEN IF THE 
ST AND ARD OF CARE INDETERL'1INABLE REGARDING USE OF 
PPH DEVICE. 
1. Additional Standard of Review. 
The Court is required to look at the expert's affidavit or deposition testimony and determine 
whether it alleges facts if taken as true. would render the testimony of that witness 
admissible. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional }vfedical Center, 137 ldaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816 
(2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts. 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). However, the liberal 
construction and reasonable inference standard does not apply when deciding whether testimony 
offered in connection with a summary judgment motion is admissible. Dulaney v. Alphonsus 
Regional 1Wedical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816 (2002); Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Afed. 
Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997). The Supreme Court reviews challenges to the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. 1.'vfagic Valley Reg 'l A--f ed 
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46. 995 P .2d 816 (2000). 
Wicke I failed to establish that Chamberlain breached the applicable standard 
of care with respect to his remaining non-PPH claims. 
The trial court is authorized to narrow the standard of care issues involved in a case. See, 
Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 120(2011 ). The standards applicable to the use of the PPH 
device were not the only standards at issue in this case. Wickel alleged that Dr. Chamberlain 
breached the local standard of care by "failing to diagnose Wickel's anal fissure on the initial visit" 
and "failed to acquire Wickel' s informed consent prior to performing medical procedures related to 
the anal fissure." Vol. L p. 15, para. 20-21. local standard of care must be established as 
to these other claims addition to the standard for use of the PPH device. 
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Scoma testified that Dr. Chamberlain should have diagnosed a fissure as the source of 
s problems rather than hemorrhoids. I, p. para. 11. Certainly, any general 
surgeons in Idaho should have had knowledge the standards applicable to diagnosing a 
fissure. However, the record is devoid of any effort on the part of Dr. Scoma or Wickel to contact 
one of these surgeons to discuss those standards. 
standard of care was indeterminable as to this allegation. 
Wickel has not demonstrated that the 
Wicke! also claimed that Dr. Chamberlain breached the local standard of care respect 
to the fissurectomy and lateral internal sphincterotomy. Again, the record is devoid any effort 
by Dr. Scoma or Wickel to discuss the standards of care relative to those procedures any of the 
general surgeons in Idaho Falls during the time period. Certainly, Dr. Chamberlain and his 
two partners were not the only ones performing those procedures during that time period and it is 
incumbent upon Wickel to establish the absence of general surgeons capable of speaking to those 
standards. He has failed to do so. 
Dr. Scoma testified that Dr. Chamberlain violated the local standard of care by dilating the 
anal canal and then also performing the sphincterotomy. R. Vol. I, p. 98, para. 13. According to Dr. 
Scoma, dilating the anal canal would have been sufficient to treat the fissure and therefore the 
sphicterotomy was unnecessary. Certainly, there were other general surgeons in Idaho Falls besides 
Dr. Chamberlain and his tvvo partners who were qualified to discuss dilation of the anai canal as an 
adequate remedy for treating a fissure. Yet the record is devoid of any effort on the part of Dr. 
Scoma or Wickel to visit with an Idaho Falls general surgeon to discuss those standards. As such, 
Wickel has failed to demonstrate that the local standard of care was indeterminable with regard to 
this issue. 
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Dr. Scoma also claimed that Dr. Chamberlain violated the local standard of care in his 
treatment of the fissure and fistula. R. Voi. L p. 99, para. 14. As noted above, the record is devoid 
of any effort by Dr. Scoma to discuss the standards of care relative to the treatment of fissures and/or 
fistulas in Idaho Falls, Idaho by general surgeons in 2007. Certainly Dr. Chamberlain and his two 
partners were not the only general surgeons in Idaho Falls qualified to render such care. No evidence 
was presented by Wickel to establish such a claim. As such, Wickel has failed to demonstrate that 
the local standard of care on that issue was indeterminable. 
Dr. Scoma also contends that Dr. Chamberlain failed to obtain informed consent from Wickel 
for the fissurectomy and lateral internal sphincterotomy (LIS). R. Vol. I, p. l 00, para. 17. The 
informed consent statute requires Dr. Chamberlain to discuss with the patient the pertinent facts and 
considerations that would ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar circumstances ·'by 
a like physician ... of good standing practicing in the same community.'' Idaho Code §39-4506 
( emphasis added). Again, the record is devoid of any effort by Dr. Scoma or Wickel to visit with 
a general surgeon in Idaho Falls to determine the standard of practice relating to informed consent 
discussions for fissurectomy and/or lateral internal sphincterotomy under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
The fact that the District Court found the local standard of care in Idaho Falls with respect 
to the PPH procedure does not relieve Wickel from establishing the Idaho Falls, Idaho standard of 
care with respect to the issues discussed above. Not only has Wickel failed to demonstrate that the 
local standard of care was indeterminable with respect to use of the PPH device. he has also failed 
to establish that the local standard of health care practice was indeterminable with regard to the 
additional alleged breaches. Likewise, Wickel offered no evidence regarding the Idaho Falls standard 
of health care practice pertaining to diagnosing anal fissures, treating anal fissures, fissurectomy, 
LIS, dilating the anal canal, or informed consent. Consequently, these additoinal claims should 
therefore be dismissed. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF DR. SCOMA IN DECIDING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
I. Additional Standard ofReview. 
The interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter oflaw which the Court has free 
review. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734 (2010). 
2. The District Court erred when it considered new evidence on Wicke! ·s 
1vfotionfor Reconsideration because a Final Judgment had been entered. 
Wickel filed his :vfotion for Reconsideration on August 12, 2013 ( R. Vol. III, p. 448) which 
was accompanied by the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma. R. Vol. m, p. 420. The 
Supplemental A/Jidav it contained additional details about Dr. Scoma' s conversation with Dr. Schmid 
about the local standard of health care practice. R. Vol. III, p. 420-21, paras. 3-4. Chamberlain filed 
a Motion to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit and argued that the district court should not consider 
the additional evidence when deciding Wicke!' s 1\,fotionfiJr Reconsideration. R. Vo L III, p. 4 50-5 7. 
The district court denied Chamberlain's Motion to Strike and ruled that it could consider the 
Supplemental Affidavit. R. Vol. III, p. 529-30. Chamberlain believes the district court's decision 
was erroneous. 
The Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of new evidence under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) 
and I.R.C.P. 59(e), in PHH Afongage Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631 (2009), stating: 
The trial court must consider new evidence that bears on the correctness of an 
interlocutory order ifrequested to do so by a timely motion under Rule l l(a)(2)(B) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Coeur d'Alene l'vfining Co. v. First 1Vat'l Bank 
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ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P .2d 1026, 103 7 ( 1990). However, the trial 
court cannot consider new evidence when asked to reconsider a final judgment 
pursuant to a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), id., or 
pursuant to a motion to amend findings of fact or conclusions of law under Rule 
52(b). 
Id. at 635. 
After the district court's granted Chamberlain's Second Afotion for Summary Judgment, it 
entered a Final .Judgment, on July 30, 2013. R. Vol. II, p. 416. Wicke! then filed a Alotionjor 
Reconsideration on August 12, 2013, requesting the district court reconsider "·its Final Judgment 
entered on July 30, 2013." R. Vol. III, p. 448. Wickel also filed the Supplemental Affidavit of 
Joseph Scoma. MD. at that time. Chamberlain argued that the district court could not consider the 
Supplemental Affidavit. R. Vol. IIL p. 471-75. 
l.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) states: 
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration ofany interlocutory 
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment 
but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion 
for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment 
may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there 
shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any 
motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.L 60(a), or 60(b). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The district court found that it could consider new information because Wicke I's 1',fotion for 
Reconsideration sought reconsideration of the district court's summary judgment decision which was 
an interlocutory order R. Vol. III, p. 529-30. However, the district court's decision ignores this 
Court's ruling in Boise Afode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, 154 Idaho 99 (2013): 
Considering the plain language of the rule and its structure, there are two different 
kinds of orders that may be reviewed. The first sentence permits a court to 
reconsider interlocutorv orders any time prior to entry of final judgment and the 
second sentence bars the court's reconsideration of orders that are made 1) after entry 
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of final judgment, and 2) pursuant to a party's Rule 59(e) motion. "This Court has 
repeatedly held that LR.C.P.11(a)(2)(B) provides a district court with authority 
to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not 
been entered." Elliottv. Darwin Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 785, 69 P.3d 1035, 
1046 (2003) (citing Telford v. }./eibaur, 130 Idaho 932, 950 P.2d 1271 (1998)); 
Sammis v. Afagnetek Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346, 941 P.2d 314, 318 (1997); Farmers 
Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994)). 
at l 06-107 ( emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court expressly held that the rule allowing a court to reconsider and 
vacate interlocutory orders so long as a final judgment has not been entered also applies to 
reconsideration of a court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1119, footnote 4. 
Due to the fact that the question on appeal turned upon an interpretation oflRCP 11 (a)(2)(B), 
the Supreme Court in Boise A1ode carefully discussed the definition of an interlocutory order, 
concluding that "an interlocutory order is an order that is temporary in nature or does not completely 
adjudicate the parties' dispute.'' Id at 107 ( emphasis added). The Court also noted, '·A judgment, 
order, or decree which is intermediate or incomplete and, while it settles some of the rights of the 
parties, leaves something remaining to be done in the adjudication of their substantial rights 
in the case by the court entertaining jurisdiction of the same is interlocutory." Id. ( emphasis 
added). 
The proceedings of the Boise Mode case are important given the Supreme Court's emphasis 
on the definition of the term interlocutory. The district court first granted summary judgment to 
Boise Mode and entered a final judgment. Id. at 103. Defendant then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to 
alter or amend the judgment which the district court granted, vacating the entry of summary 
judgment for plaintiff and reinstating all of the claims of the parties, including defendant's 
counterclaims. Id. Boise Mode then filed a motion to reconsider and Rule 59( e) motion requesting 
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that district court reconsider the reversal of previous order on summary judgment. The 
court granted Boise motion and reinstated the prior motion for summary judgment. 
A final judgment was then entered. Id. 
On appeal, defendant argued that Boise Mode's motion to reconsider under Rule l l(a)(2)(B) 
was inappropriate because the order was entered pursuant to Rule 59( e ). Id. at 106. carefully 
defining the term "interlocutory," the Idaho Supreme Court that because the order the district 
court was asked to reconsider had reinstated all of the claims of the parties, it "was not a final order 
and its entry did not complete the adjudication of the parties' rights, it was an interlocutory order" 
and "in the absence of a final judgment, it was proper for 
Boise Mode· s prior summary judgment decision.'' 
district court to revisit the merits of 
In this case. the Court· s Opinion and Order on summary judgment dismissed all of Wicke I's 
claims and completely adjudicated all of the parties' rights. Pursuant to Boise Jfode, it was not 
an interlocutory order. Further, the Court also entered a final judgment. final judgment is not an 
interlocutory order nor is it an order "·made after entry of final judgment:' 
The district court relied upon Arregui v. Gallegos-J1fain, 153 Idaho 801 12) to support its 
decision that it could consider new evidence on Wickel' s Motion for Reconsideration even though 
it had entered a final judgment. R. Vol. III, pp. 529-530. However, while Arregui is a summary 
judgment case wherein final judgments were entered and motions to reconsider were entertained by 
the Court, it does not appear that any of the parties raised the issue of whether a Rule l l(a)(2)(B) 
motion was appropriate since the court was no longer dealing with an interlocutory order. That 
distinction is made clear the Boise J\;fode case. That same distinction is applicable in this case. 
pursuant to the language found in Boise 1\lfode and Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 
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138 Idaho 774 (2003), Telford v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932 (1998), Sammis v. A1agnetek Inc., 130 
Idaho 342 (1997) and Farmers Nat'! Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63 (1994), that '·I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) 
provides a district court with authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final 
judgment has not been entered," it was not proper for the district court to reconsider its decision 
under IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). The District Court should have only done a Rule 59(e) evaluation and 
determination. 
3. The District Court should not have considered new evidence pursuant to 
IR.CF. 59(e). 
The Court is not allowed to consider new evidence in a Rule 59( e) Motion. In Barmore v. 
Perrone, 145 Idaho 340 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind the 
prohibition of considering new evidence. 
A Rule 59( e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of the court. 
An order denying a motion made under Rule 59( e) to alter or amend a judgment is 
appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a manifest abuse of 
discretion. Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the opportunity to correct 
errors both of fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a 
mechanism for corrective action short of an appeal. Such proceedings must of 
necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of the case as it existed when the 
court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based. 
Id. at 344 ( citing Coeur d'Alene };;fining Co. v. First National Bank oj}/orth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812 
(1990)) (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding 
that because a motion to amend is brought after a judgment, new evidence may not be presented). 
As such, the district court should not have considered the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. 
Scoma as discussed above, but should have treated Wickel' s ~\lotion For Reconsideration as a Rule 
59( e) Motion because of final judgment had been entered and made its ruling based upon the 
evidence in the record at the time the Final Judgment was entered. 
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D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT STRIKING THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH SCOMA, M.D .. 
l. The District Court should have granted Chamberlain ·s :\lotion to Strike 
statements in paragraph 3 of the Supplemental Affidavit. 
Even assuming for the sake ofargument only that the district court correctly treated Wickel · s 
Motion as a :\lotion for Reconsideration, the district court erred in not striking the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Dr. Scoma either in part or in its entirety. Paragraph 3 of the Supplemental Affidavit 
contains entirely conclusory and factually unsupported statements which should be stricken from the 
record and not relied upon by the Court. R. Vol. III, p. 420-21. It alleges, that Dr. Schmid 
'·conveyed to [Dr. Scoma] that there were no deviations in how he had been trained to use the PPH 
device in Twin Falls than anywhere else.'· Id However, there is no evidence in Dr. Scoma's first 
affidavit or the Supplemantal Affidavit that Dr. Schmid received training on the PPH device in Twin 
Falls or that he had used the PPH device any vvhere other than Twin Fails. As such, there is no 
factual basis for the claim that there were no deviations in how he had been trained to use the device 
from anywhere else. The statement is speculative, conclusory, and lacks sufficient factual foundation 
to be admissible. 
The same holds true for the immediately preceding sentence, '·Dr. Schmid told me that in 
January 2010 there was nothing unique or special about the manner in which hemorrhoidectomies 
were performed with the PPH device.'' R. Vol. III, p. 421. Where is the foundation to show how 
Dr. Schmid knows that? Has he used the PPH in other locations in the State ofldaho or outside the 
State of Idaho? If so, when and where? Other than the Salt Lake training (and we don't know for 
sure when that was even obtained), has he attended other training with regard to using the PPH to 
perform hemorrhoidectomies? If so. when and where? Has he spoken to other general surgeons 
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anY¼·here about how they use the PPH device to perform hemorrhoidectomies? If so, who and 
when? Has he read any medical journals describing how the PPH device is used to perform 
hemorrhoidectomies? If so, what? As it stands, the statement is simply conclusory and lacks any 
foundation. 
Also in paragraph 3, Dr. Scoma alleges, "During our conversation he said that the standard 
of care for general surgeons in Twin Falls would be the same regardless of location, i.e., that the 
standard of care in Tvvin Falis was a national standard as opposed to including any unique deviations 
from the national standard of care." R. Vol. III, p. 421. This statement is similar to the prior 
statement contained in Dr. Scoma's first affidavit only now directed at Twin Falls rather than the 
entire state ofidaho. R. Vol. I, p. 95. Nevertheless, the statement is still speculative, conclusory and 
lacking in any factual foundation. 
Even if a national standard exists, how does Dr. Schmid know what it is? Has he spoken 
with any other general surgeons outside of Twin Falls regarding the practice of using a PPH device? 
Has he even spoken with other general surgeons in Tvvin Falls regarding the practice of using a PPH 
device? Has he participated in training on how to use a PPH device any where other than Salt Lake 
City, Utah-seven to ten years ago? Was this alleged national standard the same in 2010 as it is 
today? \Vhat is the alleged national standard? Did Dr. Schmid and Dr. Scoma discuss what they 
each believed the alleged national standard regarding PPH was to make sure they were on the same 
page? 
Without this information, how can the Court possibly know whether Dr. Schmid knew about 
the alleged '·national standard of care., pertaining to the use of a PPH device in performing 
hemorrhoid surgery or that it is the same standard Dr. Scoma believes it is? The Court is still left 
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to speculate regarding these conclusory statements. such, the district court should have struck 
them from the record. 
Wickel argues that because Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Schmid were both allegedly trained by 
the same physician, that is sufficient foundation for Dr. Scoma to know the appropriate standard of 
practice. In paragraph 4 of the Supplemental Affidavit, Dr. Scoma claims that Dr. Schmid said he 
received his training on the Ethicon device from Dr. Eyring in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. Vol. III, p. 
421. The Court is not advised as to when that training took place. Dr. Scoma states that Dr. Schmid 
allegedly informed him that he has been treating hemorrhoids via hemorrhoidectomies with the PPH 
device for seven to ten years (presumably from August 6, 2013-the date of the most recent telephone 
call). R. Vol. III, p. 421. 
As drafted, without venturing into the realm of speculation and conjecture, it is impossible 
to determine when Dr. Schmid received his training with Dr. EyTing. Even if the Court were to 
speculate that Dr. Schmid was originally trained on the PPH device by Dr. Eyring in Salt Lake City 
prior to performing his first procedure seven to ten years ago, that would mean he was trained 
sometime between 2003 and 2006. Dr. Chamberlain \vas trained in 2002. R. Vol. I, p. 157 
(Chamberlain Depo, p. 19, 11. - p. 20, ll. 5). Was the same training being provided by Dr. Eyring 
one to four years later? Based upon this record, we do not know. It would be speculative, at best, 
to conclude that because both surgeons were allegedly trained by the same physician approximately 
one to four years apart, the training they each received on using the PPH device was identical or that 
there were no significant differences. 
2. This should adopt sham affidavit doctrine strike the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma under the same. 
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During his deposition, Dr. Scoma testified that and Dr. Schmid "just talked about what 
standard of care was for a general surgeon in Idaho doing a hemorrhoidectomy." Vol. 
p. 264 (Scoma Depa., p. 71, 19-25). During that conversation, Dr. Schmid said that "the 
standard of care in Idaho was the national standard of care. There's no difference whether 
it be in Twin Falls, Idaho Falls, or anywhere else.'' R. Vol. p. 264 (Scoma Depo., p. 71, 19-
25). Dr. Scoma could not recall anvthing else about that telephone conversation with Dr. Schmid. 
Vol. II, p. 264 (Scoma Depo., p. 72, 11. 1-3). 
According to Dr. Scoma' s deposition testimony, Dr. Schmid told him that the Idaho standard 
of care for a general surgeon performing hemorrhoidectomies was a national standard of care-there 
allegedly was no difference whether that specific procedure \Vas done Twin Falls or Idaho Falls. 5 
However, in his Supplemenral Affidavit, without the benefit of any kind of recording of the 
initial telephone conversation with Dr. Schmid, miraculously and just \Vhen Wickel needs it most, 
Dr. Scoma recalled additional information which he alleged Dr. Schmid provided to him during that 
conversation. This has all the markings ofa sham affidavit. The Court should not sanction an expert 
witness testifying under oath to one thing and then providing different affidavit testimony later 
( which is not subject to cross examination) in an effort to avoid summary judgment. Such a practice 
is unfair and prejudicial to the opposing party. This Court should therefore adopt the sham affidavit 
doctrine and strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma. 
5 This version of what occurred is consistent with Dr. Scoma's first affidavit in 
which he testified that based on his discussion with Dr. Schmid, it was his opinion that 
"Physicians in Idaho practiced in conformance with the national standard of care in 2010." 
R. Vol. I, p. 421, para. 5. For that reason, defendant challenged the foundation for Dr. Scoma or 
Dr. Schmid to make render such an opinion. 
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E. WICKEL DID NOT OFFER SUFFICIENT ADMISSIBLE EVlDENCE TO 
EST AB LISH THAT DR SCOMA WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE 
APPLICABLE ST AND ARD OF HEAL TH CARE PRACTICE. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The Court is required to look at the expert's affidavit or deposition testimony and determine 
whether it alleges facts which, if taken as true, would render the testimony of that witness 
admissible. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Jfedical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816 
(2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208. 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). However, the liberal 
construction and reasonable inference standard does not apply when deciding whether testimony 
offered in connection with a summary judgment motion is admissible. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus 
Regional lvfedical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 163. 45 P.3d 816 (2002); Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg ·z J;fed. 
Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997). The Supreme Court reviews challenges to the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. Jfagic Valley Reg'! i'vfed. 
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000). 
2. There is no evidence establishing that Dr. Schmid vvas familiar with the 
national standard of care in January o/2010. 
Dr. Scoma has attempted to testify that the Twin Falls standard of care does not deviate from 
the national standard of care. He bases this testimony on a telephone conversation he had with Dr. 
Schmid wherein Dr. Schmid stated .. that the standard of care for general surgeons in Twin Falls 
would be the same regardless oflocation, i.e., that the standard of care in Twin Falls was a national 
standard.'" R. Vol. III, p. 421, para. 3. 
Dr. Schmid' s statement to Dr. Scoma - that the Twin Falls standard of care is the same as the 
national standard - is not sufficient to familiarize Dr. Scoma with the applicable standard of care. 
This Court has stated: 
..,.., 
.) .) 
Rule 56( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure imposes additional requirements 
upon the admission of expert medical testimony submitted in connection with a 
motion for summary judgment. The party offering such evidence must show that it 
is based upon the vvitness' personal knowledge and that it sets forth facts as would be 
admissible in evidence. Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! }.,fed. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, . 940 
P.2d l 142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224 (1994). The 
party offering the evidence must also affirmatively show that the witness is 
competent to testify about the matters stated in his testimony. Kolin v. Saint Luke's 
Reg'! 1Hed. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d 1142 (1997); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 
Idaho 208, 868 P .2d 1224 (1994 ). Statements that are conclusory or speculative 
do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 
56(e). Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142 (1997); 
Hecla 1\tfining Co. v. Star-Aforning ,\lining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 
(1992). 
An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must 
show that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care 
professional for the relevant community and time. Perry v. Afogic Valley Reg'! Jvfed. 
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 
P.2d 1224 (1994). The expert must also state how he or she became familiar with 
that standard of care. Perry v. Afagic -valley Reg'l }vfed. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 
P.2d 816 (2000); Rhode house v. Stutts. 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994 ). 
Delaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'I },.fed. Ctr .. 13 7 Idaho 160, 164 (2002) ( emphasis added). 
In order to testify that the Twin Falls standard of health care practice was equivalent vvith 
some yet unidentified national standard of health care practice, there must be evidence establishing 
that Dr. Schmid was personally familiar with the alleged national standard of care. The record is 
devoid of any such evidence. To simply claim that an amorphous national standard of health care 
practice exists and that national standard was the standard of health care practice in Twin Falls in 
January 2010 is simply conclusory. 
There is no mention in Dr. Scoma' s first affidavit that Dr. Schmid was personally familiar 
with this claimed national standard of health care practice, only that Dr. Scoma himself determined 
that the Twin Falls standard of care was the same as the national standard of care. R. Vol. I, p. 96, 
para. 5. In Dr. Scoma' s Supplemental Ajfidavit, he stated that Dr. Schmid '·conveyed to me that there 
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were no deviations in how he had been trained to used the PPH device in Twin Falls than anywhere 
else·' and that "the standard of care in Twin Falls was a national standard as opposed to including 
any unique deviations from the national standard of care .. , R. Vol. III, p. 420-21, para. 3. Hovvever, 
facts establishing how Dr. Schmid became aware that there were no differences from "anywhere 
else'· or that there were no unique deviations from this yet undisclosed --national standard of care·' 
are noticeably absent. 
It is important to note that there is no other evidence about what the Twin Falls standard of 
care is. Thus, the only way for Dr. Scoma to knovv the actual Twin Falls standard of care was ifhe 
and Dr. Schmid both knew, discussed, and agreed upon what the alleged national standard of care 
was. However, there is no evidence in Dr. Scoma· s affidavits that Dr. Schmid was personally 
familiar with the national standard of care in 20 l O or how he obtained that information. 
For example, no facts have been presented to support a finding that Dr. Schmid received PPH 
training anywhere but Salt Lake City, Utah or that he performed PPH anywhere but in Twin Falls, 
Idaho or that he discussed PPH with any other general surgeons anywhere outside of Twin Falls, 
Idaho. Where is the factual foundation for the assertion that the procedure was performed no 
differently in Twin Falls than anywhere else? 
There are no facts indicating that the PPH training Dr. Schmid received in Salt Lake City was 
standardized and consistent with training provided across the country. Other than having the same 
instructor, there isn't even sufiicient evidence to establish that the training Dr. Schmid received was 
the same as that obtained by Dr. Chamberlain. Wickel has produced no standards for performing 
PPH adopted or drafted by any national organization such as the American College of Surgeons to 
establish that some national standard of health care practice pertaining to PPH even exists. Neither 
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Dr. Scoma nor Dr. Schmid have ever stated where the claimed national standard of health care 
practice can be found or who determined what that standard should be. 
Without evidence of Dr. Schmid's actual, personal familiarity with the aileged national 
standard of care, Dr. Schmid has no foundation upon which to testify that the Twin Falls standard 
of health care practice was the same as some national standard of care in January 2010. The Court 
correctly found as much in its July 25, 2013 Opinion and Order on Defendant ·s Second 1\tfotionfor 
Summary Judgment. stating that ·'Dr. Schmid·s statement that the local standard of care was the 
national standard is conclusory and without facts to support his actual knowledge." R. Vol. II, p. 
413. Without any evidence that Dr. Schmid was personally familiar with the alleged national 
standard of health care practice pertaining to PPH, his statements to Dr. Scoma that the Twin Falls 
standard was the same as the national standard of care could not serve as the foundation for Dr. 
Scoma becoming familiar with the Twin Falls standard of health care practice. [n other words, if Dr. 
Schmid was not familiar with the national standard of care and/or Dr. Schmid did not know what 
Dr. Scoma understood the national standard of care to be, his statements to Dr. Scoma that the Twin 
Falls standard of care was the same as the national standard of care could not convey any meaningful 
information to Dr. Scoma as to what the Twin Falls standard of care was. As a result, Dr. Scoma 
has still not properly familiarized himself with the Twin Falls standard of care. 
The foundation as to how Dr. Schmid was familiar with the standard of care is absolutely 
necessary. \Vithout any evidence that Dr. Schmid was personally familiar with the alleged national 
standard of health care practice pertaining to PPH, his statements to Dr. Scoma that the Twin Falls 
standard was the same as the national standard of care could not serve as the foundation for Dr. 
Scoma becoming familiar with the Twin Falls standard of health care practice. As a result, Dr. 
Scoma has still not properly familiarized himself with the Twin Falls standard of care. 
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3. There is no evidence establishing that Dr. Scoma was familiar with the 
national standard of care. 
There is no evidence that Scoma has personal knowledge alleged national standard 
of care. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that where an expert demonstrates ·"that a local 
standard does not vary from the national standard, coupled with the expert's personal knowledge 
of the national standard, is sufficient to lay a foundation for the expert's opinion.'· Perry v. A.fagic 
Valley Reg'! ;\:.fed. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51 (2000) ( emphasis added); see also Suhadolnikv. Pressman, 
151 Idaho 110, 116(2011) (stating that "where an expert demonstrates that a local standard of care 
has been replaced by a statewide or national standard of care, and further demonstrates that he or she 
is familiar with the statewide or national standard, the foundational requirements of I.C. § 6-1013 
have been met"). 
There is no statement in Dr. Scoma' s three affidavits or his deposition testimony that he has 
personal knowledge of the alleged national standard of care. In his first Affidavit Dr. Scoma states 
that he discussed the applicable standard of care Dr. Schmid and based on that conversation 
Dr. Scoma determined that the '·standard of care does not deviate from the national standard of care 
and that, in fact, the national standard of care had supplanted any local standard of care as of 20 l O" 
and that "Physicians in Idaho practiced in conformance with the national standard of care in 2010." 
Vol. I, p. 96-97, para. 5. 
While Dr. Scoma mentions an alleged national standard of care, he does not state that he has 
personal knowledge of the claimed national standard of care. Nor does he state how he obtained 
personal knowledge ofany such standard. ·'Concl usory statements that an expert is familiar with the 
local standard because is familiar with the national standard are insufficient to meet the 
requirements of § 013." 1\:fcDaniel Inland Northwest Renal Group, l 
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Idaho 21 223 (2007) ( citing Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 21 989)). Based upon the current 
state of the record, the Court must simply assume that because Dr. Scoma is a board certified general 
and colorectal surgeon, he has personal knowledge of this alleged national standard of health care 
practice. Such an assumption is improper. 
The Court cannot simply make this assumption. More foundation is required as Perry v. 
Afagic Valley Reg'! 1\lfed and Suhadolnik v. Pressman make clear. Without demonstrating 
familiarity with or personal knowledge of this alleged national standard of care, Dr. Scoma is not 
qualified to make the determination that the local standard does not deviate from the national 
standard. Wickel has therefore failed to establish that Chamberlain breached the standard of care 
through the required expert testimony. As a result, all 
dismissed. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
claims against Chamberlain should be 
Wicke! failed to show that there was an absence of other similarly situated health care 
providers in community. Thus, the District Court erred in holding that the local standard care 
for general surgeons in Idaho Falls January 20 l O was indeterminable with respect to the use of the 
PPH device. 
assuming that the District Court was correct in determining that the local standard of 
care was indeterminable for PPH procedures, that did not relieve Wickel of establishing the fdaho 
Falls standard of health care in January, 20 l O as to all other issues. Wickel has also failed to 
establish through an expert adequately familiar with the applicable standard of care that Chamberlain 
breached the local standard of care regarding the additional alleged breaches. Consequently, these 
additoinal claims should be dismissed. 
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Toe District Court also erred when it considered new evidence on Wickel' s Motion for 
Reconsideration. The District Court had entered a final judgment precluding it from considering 
new evidence pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) and Boise Mode. The District Court should have 
considered Wickel's Motion/or Reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion and made its ruling based 
upon the record at the time the Final Judgment was entered. Further, the District Court should have 
granted Chamberlain's Moiton to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma. It contained 
speculative and conclusory statements regarding Dr. Scbmid's familiarity ,v:ith the national standard 
of care and the purported Idaho standard of care. Tb.is Court should also adopt the sham affidavit 
doctrine to protect opposing parties and strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Dr. Scoma under the 
same. The Court should not sanction an expert witness testifying under oath to one thing and then 
providing d:iff erent testimony later in order to avoid summary judgment. Such a practice is unfair 
and prejudicial to the opposing party. 
Finally, Wickel has failed to establish that Dr. Scoma or Dr. Schmid were familiar with the 
national standard of care in January, 2010. There is only speculative and conclusory testimony that 
states they were familiar with the national standard of care. This testimony fails to establish how 
they became fa..rniliar vvith the national standard of care. This testimony is insufficient under Idaho 
law to establish that they were indeed familiar with the national standard of care. Wickel has 
therefore failed to establish that Chamberlain breached the standard of care through the required 
expert testimony. As a result, all of his claims against Chamberlain should be dismissed. 
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